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Are all Socialists Anti-religious? 
Anti-religiosity and the Socialist Left in 21 Western European countries 
(1990-2008). 
 
Abstract 
The political situation in the Soviet Union during the twentieth century has led some to suggest 
that socialism is some kind of secular religion as opposed to ‘normal’ religion. In modern 
Europe, however, there have also been vibrant Christian socialist movements. This paper looks 
into the different attitudes of socialists towards religion and answers the question whether it is 
pressure of religious activity or pressure of religious identity that makes socialists resist religion. 
The results from a multilevel analysis of three waves of the European Values Study (1990-2008) 
in 21 Western European countries point specifically to an increase in anti-religiosity by 
socialists in countries marked by the Catholic and Orthodox religious identity. 
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Introduction: socialism and anti-religiosity  
Socialism is man’s positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through the abolition of religion – 
Karl Marx
i
 
For Karl Marx, socialism was about the realization of an ideal society that had overcome 
the problems associated with capitalism and religion. This did not necessarily involve fighting 
religion at all cost. He did not envision an anti-religious society, but a society that no longer 
needed to be concerned about religion at all. Followers of Marx, however, did concern 
themselves with religion. Much of the history of the 20
th
 century is marked by the Russian 
attempt to become a world power based on a socialist ‘scientific atheistic’ ideology. Froese (37) 
notes that “post-revolutionary Russia appeared the ideal place to spread the doctrine of scientific 
atheism. Leading up to the Russian Revolution, many Russians were completely disillusioned 
with their political and cultural traditions and after the Tsarist regime was overthrown, many 
believed in the promises of a new socialist utopia”. Indeed, the Russian Orthodox state religion 
boasted adherence rates of no less than 76 percent in 1900, with 0 percent non-religiosity, 
whereas during the Soviet rule these numbers had by 1970 declined to 28 percent and increased 
to 52 percent respectively (Barro and McCleary).  
However, the marriage between Soviet socialism and the anti-religious agenda the Soviet 
rulers advocated has not been the only way in which socialists have concerned themselves with 
religion. Contemporary socialist movements boast a wide range of different attitudes towards 
religion, ranging from fiercely anti-religious to mild and tolerant. In Western Europe for 
example, French socialism traditionally boasts and promotes disbelief and secularism on the one 
hand, aiming to remove all references to God from education and public administration 
(Knutsen; Waller and Fennema). On the other hand, in countries like the Netherlands and the 
4  
 
United Kingdom, socialists traditionally show an indifferent or even tolerant attitude towards 
religion (Waller and Fennema; Brown). Apparently, there is nothing inherently ‘anti-religious’ 
about socialism. It can be both tolerant and intolerant towards religion. This raises the question 
what makes socialists have anti-religious attitudes in some countries, while in others they are 
tolerant towards religion.  
This paper addresses this question and aims to develop and test a theory about variations 
in anti-religious attitudes among socialists across national contexts in Western-Europe. First of 
all, we will develop what we call the ‘religious pressure’ thesis, on the basis of a literature 
review. We will derive two hypotheses from the latter about how the religious context affects the 
degree to which socialists embrace anti-religious attitudes. We will then test these hypotheses by 
means of a multilevel analysis of survey data from the European Values Study for 21 Western-
European countries (1990-2008). We will summarize our conclusions in the final section. 
 
Socialism and Anti-Religiosity in Western Europe 
For long, socialism has been associated with the opposition to religion, the church and 
faith in many European countries. This has not only been the case in Communist Eastern Europe; 
anti-religiosity has also surfaced in Western European countries like France, Italy and Germany. 
The historian McLeod describes how in the latter country, to become a socialist was part of a 
larger trend of dechristianisation during the imperial period, especially for working class people 
(McLeod ‘Protestantism’). He presents German socialism as a much needed ideological 
alternative for the Lutheran church. Socialists “tried to escape from the influence of the state and 
its ideological allies by creating a comprehensive range of counter-institutions within which their 
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distinctive identity could be preserved and their distinctive ideas propagated” (335). By the end 
of the 19
th
 and during the 20
th
 century, this pattern has been visible in many Western European 
countries. In France, the need for an alternative to the religious worldview became so pressing 
that there were groups on the political left that not only rejected religion, but developed 
alternative rites and rituals modelled after religious behaviours (e.g. the ‘Society of Mutual 
Autopsy’, Hecht).  
Nevertheless, the anti-religiosity of these socialists is not the whole story. The popularity 
and growth of socialism did not only inspire apostates and non-religious people; it also 
influenced the theologians and religious philosophers of that time. To many Christians, the 
egalitarian and social programme of socialism was very appealing. As a result, a Christian 
socialist movement developed from the beginning of the 20
th
 century and onwards which 
received wide recognition, amongst others by the famous German theologian Karl Barth. He 
supposedly said that ‘A true Christian must be a socialist (if he is serious about the reformation 
of Christianity). A true socialist must be a Christian (if he is concerned with the reformation of 
socialism)’ (Barth qtd. in Busch 83). Other well-known proponents of this view were Paul Tillich 
in the United States and Gustavo Gutierrez in Latin America (Stenger and Stone; Gill). This 
popularity of socialism among Christians led to the formation of Christian socialist parties in 
several Western European countries, many of which later merged with social democratic or 
green parties (this happened in Britain and the Netherlands, for example, Cort; Bas).  
From the anti-religious ‘Society of Mutual Autopsy’ (Hecht) to the progressively 
Christian ‘Evangelische volkspartij’ (‘Evangelical People’s Party’, Bas), socialists have 
developed a wide variety in attitudes towards religion. An indication of a possible explanation 
for this variation is given by Steve Bruce, who notes that the values and practices of the British 
6  
 
political left are heavily influenced by the Protestant sects (“Secularization” 8): ‘The British 
labour movement always owed far more to the Methodists and Baptists than it did to Karl Marx’. 
This suggests that the variety in attitudes towards religion could be explained by the local 
religious context (also see Brown). This idea can also be found in the works of David Martin on 
secularization (“General theory” and “Revised”). He states that politics and religion are 
‘isomorphic’ in the sense that ‘historic religious moulds of European societies are mirrored in 
characteristic secular mutations and transpositions’ (“Revised” 80), as if ‘You read one from the 
other’ (47). This implies that the differences in attitude of socialists towards religion, can be 
explained by the differences that can be found in the various religious contexts. The specific 
pressure exerted in this religious context will determine the attitude of socialists towards religion. 
We call this the ‘religious pressure thesis’. Our aim is to further develop this thesis and test the 
hypotheses that can be derived from it. 
 
The religious pressure thesis on anti-religiosity and socialism 
The religious pressure thesis focuses on the role of the religious context in explaining 
anti-religiosity. This approach is primarily based on David Martin’s writing on secularization. 
Central to his secularization theory is the way in which different religious cultures shape the 
trajectories of secularization in those countries (Martin “Really said”). For Martin, religion does 
more than provide for the religious needs of some individuals. It penetrates into the cultural 
make-up of a country and continues to do so long after people have stopped going to church. 
Talking about nationalism and religious identities, he states that ‘[r]eligion carries national 
identity under threat: after all, religion almost always fulfils other roles than what we today label 
purely religious’ (Martin “Nationalism”). This is an important observation for the theoretical 
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understanding of what a religion does to a culture. Martin speaks of ‘religious cultures’, looking 
into the way religion influences elements of the broader culture like language, architecture, art, 
and literature. Thus, when we speak of those who are no longer connected to a religious 
institution of some sort (the non-religious or the secular), or those who are opposed to a religious 
institution of any kind (the anti-religious or the secularist), and when we speak about the process 
that tries to describe these processes of changing roles for and attitudes towards religion 
(trajectories or narratives of secularization), we must look at the specific religious culture in 
which these processes occur (“General theory” and “Revised”, see also Berlinerblau; Calhoun et 
al.; Casanova, Lee, Ribberink and Houtman). 
Martin’s ‘religious cultures’ argument counters the arguments of those who still see the 
overcoming of religion by the secular as the next phase in the development of modernity, or in 
his words the ‘interim formation prior to the secular denouement’. He continues to say that 
‘[t]here are, for example, numerous accounts of Christian socialism which treat it as ‘only’ an 
interim anticipation of real secular socialism’ (“Revised” 8, see also Taylor “Secular”). Instead, 
Martin suggests we should look at both the religious and the political phenomena as closely 
interrelated. This implies that anti-religious movements are connected to a religious culture in 
such a way that they can be seen as mirror images of the religious movements they despise 
(compare Asad; Bruce “Secularization” 8; Williamson and Yancey).  
In the literature on this topic, it is almost always Catholicism and socialism that feature 
when it comes to the mirroring of religious culture. For example, Martin distinguishes various 
types of national religious cultures, amongst other things on the basis of the presence of a 
Catholic or Orthodox religious monopoly. This type of religious culture, he explains, is 
particularly susceptible to manifestations of the secular - not so much merely non-religious in a 
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benevolent and tolerant fashion, but rather as a sort of secular religion in itself, leavened with 
anti-religious zeal (“General theory” 24): 
  (A) Catholic or Orthodox monopoly creates a militant counter-image of itself. The nexus 
of the French Enlightenment doctrines resembles a Catholicism inverted and the secular 
religions produced by France are sometimes a form of Catholicism without Christianity.  
According to Martin, religious cultures dominated by a Catholic or Orthodox religion are more 
likely to evoke unequivocally anti-religious reactions than more pluralistic Protestant religious 
cultures. Also, as several authors have argued, in the context of Catholic and Orthodox cultures 
this reaction almost always has a socialist political agenda (Bruce “Dead”:10; Martin “General 
theory” and “Revised”, McLeod “Religion”; Van Rooden; Campbell 224; Taylor “Future”).  
What these authors do not make clear, however, is what it is in the Catholic or Orthodox 
religious cultures, as opposed to Protestant cultures, that makes socialists develop anti-religious 
attitudes. Is it related to the notion that Catholics are more religiously active and that this activity 
is experienced as more repressing towards non-Catholics? Or is their collective identity itself 
seen as a larger threat to socialist ideals than the Protestant identity? In other words, what kind of 
religious pressure does effectively evoke an anti-religious attitude in socialists? Is it pressure of 
religious activity or pressure of religious identity that leads these socialists into resisting 
religion
ii
? Based on a discussion of available literature, we will now develop two hypotheses in 
order to answer this question. 
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Hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis will look at the religious pressure formed by religious activity in a 
certain context. Since the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the overarching power of 
the Christian churches has declined significantly, although this has been a more manifest process 
in the Protestant countries than in the predominantly Catholic and Orthodox ones (Berger 
“Rumor”; Bruce “Secularization”; Martin “General Theory”; Taylor “Future”). In the changing 
religious climate that affected all these churches, those that remained strong became even more 
active, while others, especially those that had a more formal and nominal following, lost much of 
their presence and influence (Achterberg et al.). In general, it can be said that the Catholic and 
Orthodox churches were part of the first group and the Protestant churches part of the latter. This 
implies that in Catholic or Orthodox countries nowadays, religion is more of a cultural force to 
reckon with than in Protestant countries, since it is more active, present and socially visible. We 
expect that the personal confrontation between actively religious people and socialists will 
harden the negative attitude of socialists towards religions and the religious, and lead them to 
consider a more activist anti-religious position (e.g. Visser). The first hypothesis that can be 
formulated is that the higher the national level of active religious involvement, the more 
socialists tend to have anti-religious attitudes (Hypothesis 1). 
Apart from David Martin, authors like Peter Berger (“Rumor”) and Charles Taylor 
(“Future”) have also pointed to the collective national identity that Catholicism and Orthodoxy 
have been able to create. In those countries where the Catholic or Orthodox Church has deeply 
impacted the sense of national identity people have, socialists who want to reform society 
according to their political ideas, find their main obstacle to be the dominating cultural force that 
the Catholic or Orthodox Church is. Taylor argues that when a collective religion overlaps with 
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the political identity, and that religion claims total power and control, this will call for anti-
clerical reactions of total control by the state as well (“Future” 226). Martin argues that the 
countries with Catholic or Orthodox monopolies
iii
 feature predominantly collective values, like 
solidarity, nationalism and respect for authority, which are the basis for social and cultural 
monocultures (“General theory”). We would expect socialists to mirror these collective religious 
structures by building political counter-structures, which in this context will inevitably be anti-
religious. Martin calls those structures ‘rivalrous secular universalisms’ (76). Here, the argument 
is centred on the pressure formed by the collective instead of the active type of religiosity. This 
leads us to formulate the following hypothesis: In countries with high levels of Catholic or 
Orthodox affiliation, people with high levels of socialist ideals will also have high levels of anti-
religious attitudes (Hypothesis 2). 
 
Data and operationalization 
In order to be able to test these two hypotheses, we have used the following data sets of 
the European Values Study
iv
: EVS 1990 (2
nd
 wave), EVS 1999 (3
rd
 wave), EVS 2008 (4
th
 wave). 
These data sets are the most commonly used data sets that deal with economic, political and 
religious values in Western Europe. We excluded the 1981 data set, because it contained too few 
variables that were included in the other three waves as well. Only in the last three waves did we 
find enough overlap in the questions asked to use them as a single combined data set. The reason 
that we wanted to use more than one wave has to do with the fact that it gives us a larger number 
of countries to work with, since each country that was part of more than one EVS-wave counts 
double (or more) in the country-level data-analysis. This is important for the multilevel analysis 
design, since it gives us a larger country-level sample size
v
. In the discussion on the decline of 
11  
 
religion in some regions and the resurgence of religion in others, Western Europe is commonly 
seen as ‘the odd one out’vi (Martin “Revised” 47; see also Berger “Desecularization”; Greeley; 
Bruce “Secularization”). Unlike in other Western countries, such as the United States of 
America, the church has lost most of its former strength, adherence and influence in most 
Western European countries. Its diverse pattern of religious cultures and large shares of non-
religious people provide a very interesting background for our study of non-religiosity, socialism 
and anti-religiosity. The Western European countries under study here are (year of EVS-wave 
between brackets): Austria (1990, 1999, 2008) Belgium (1990, 1999, 2008), Cyprus (2008)
vii
, 
Denmark (1990, 1999, 2008), Finland (1990, 1999, 2009), France (1990, 1999, 2008), Germany 
(1990, 1999, 2008), Greece (2008)
viii
, Great Britain (1990, 1999, 2009), Iceland (1990, 1999, 
2008), Ireland (1990, 1999, 2008), Italy (1990, 1999, 2009), Luxembourg (1999, 2008), Malta 
(1990, 1999, 2008), the Netherlands (1990, 1999, 2008), Norway (1990, 2008), Portugal (1990, 
1999, 2008), Spain (1991, 1999, 2008), Sweden (1990, 1999 2008), Switzerland (2008), and 
Northern Ireland (1990, 1999, 2008) with a N=68,918 in 58 country/waves. 
Socialist ideology is measured by looking at the respondents’ preference for voting for a 
political party which is based on socialist ideology, combined with the creation of a scale tapping 
the respondents’ attitudes towards socialist political-economic views. We are interested to see 
under what circumstances a wide variety of people adhering to a socialist ideology take on anti-
religious ideals. For the voting preferences therefore, we did not only include the far left, but also 
the mainstream social democratic parties that are promoting economic equality and a large role 
for the state in providing for its citizens. Based on the classification done by the Manifesto 
Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project (MRG/CMP)
ix
, we coded all political parties of 
Western Europe either as ‘socialist’ (including communist and social democrats) or ‘else’ 
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(including the greens, liberals, conservatives and nationalists). People  indicating a preference for 
socialist parties were coded 1, all others were coded 0.  
For the political/economical views that are part of the socialist ideology scale, we had to 
limit ourselves to those items that have been included in all three waves of the European Values 
Study. One question was whether respondents would prefer businesses to be owned by private 
people or by government on a scale of 1-10, where a higher score (10) would indicate preference 
for the latter. A similar question was asked to measure whether respondents would see 
competition as something good (1) or harmful (10) for people’s work ethic and creativity. Again 
a similar question was asked, looking at whether respondents would hold individuals or the state 
responsible to provide for people’s well-being, where again a higher score (10) would indicate 
preference for the latter. All items were standardized and linearly combined in order to create a 
scale for ‘socialism’ (see Table 1x). 
[insert Table 1 around here] 
Anti-religiosity is measured by looking at the two items that can be seen to measure the 
respondents’ hostility towards religion. One item asks whether the respondent is a religious 
person. The answers to this item differentiate between religious, non-religious and ‘convinced 
atheist’. Although the term ‘atheist’ is very much contested and can mean many different things, 
in this case it is clear that people have to see it as something different from religious and non-
religious. We assume that most respondents will have read the term ‘convinced atheist’ meaning 
‘anti-religious’, since the other options do include the religious and non-religious category. Read 
in this way, people react to this question positively (religious), neutral (non-religious) or 
negatively (convinced atheist). Therefore we coded people with religious preference as 1, non-
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religious preference as 2, and convinced atheist as 3 (answer category ‘do not know’ was coded 
as missing).  
The item that asks for people’s confidence in the church as an institution can also be seen 
as an expression of religious tolerance (or the opposite: intolerance). Its answer category is a 4-
point scale, ranging from ‘a great deal’ to ‘none at all’. We used the mean of the standardized 
results of this measure (which has already been coded in such a way that high scores indicate 
mistrust of the church), together with the standardized score for the ‘convinced atheist’ item, to 
create an index for anti-religiosity. The factor and reliability analysis of this scale is presented in 
Table 2. 
[insert Table 2 around here] 
Central to our hypotheses are the different ways in which religious pressure can lead 
socialists to develop an anti-religious attitude. The first measure of religious pressure is based on 
the active religiosity per country. Attendance rates indicate the actual presence and activities of 
religion in a certain culture. We could look at all kinds of measures of active religiosity, but the 
most straightforward way here, is to look at how many people in a country actually go to church 
and how regularly. Therefore the measure we use is church attendance rates on a national level. 
We use the specific item that asked for church visits besides weddings and funerals and similar 
occasions, and coded all people that attended once a month or more positive (answers 1-3 = 1) 
and those that only went on religious holidays, just once a year or never neutral (answers 4-8 = 
0). We calculated an average score per country on this item, which is a percentage of the total 
population that actively visits church services. An overview of the frequencies of this measure 
has been given in Table 3.  
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The second measure of religious pressure is related to the collective identity of a religious 
culture. The most straightforward way of measuring this is the level of affiliation with Catholic 
or Orthodox churches
xi
 in a country. We call this variable the Catholic/Orthodox Religiosity. All 
respondents were asked if they were a member of a religious denomination (yes=1, no=0) and if 
so, which their religious denomination was. We selected the respondents that had indicated to be 
a member of a Catholic or an Orthodox denomination. These scores were combined, so that we 
could create a score per country that indicates the share of a country’s population that is affiliated 
with either the Catholic or Orthodox denomination. We used the same calculation to create a 
similar variable for Protestant Religiosity (including the Free Church) as a control variable on a 
national level. An overview of the frequencies of this measure has been given in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
As control variables at the individual level, we used gender, age and education
xii
. Age is 
an item with answers ranging from 15 years to 108 years. Level of education is measured by the 
variable that asks for the age when people finished formal education
xiii
. In order to get a feel for 
the variables that were thus created, the descriptive statistics for each of the variables have been 
presented below in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
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Results  
With the analysis of our pooled data set on political/economical and religious values, we 
intend to test the validity of our two hypotheses. Our aim with this test is to validate the religious 
pressure thesis, which describes how in some specific religious cultures, socialists tend to react 
more strongly against religious pressure than in others. We expect that socialists  have higher 
levels of anti-religiosity as a reaction to both active religiosity and the collective religiosity of the 
Catholic/Orthodox churches. 
We use ordinary least squares linear multilevel analysis with maximum likelihood 
estimation to test these hypotheses for two reasons. First and foremost, multilevel analysis makes 
it possible to simultaneously estimate effects of individual-level variables and of country-level 
variables. As our data is structured in such a way that there are two levels, 68,918 individuals 
with certain characteristics (e.g. age, education, voting behaviour, etc.) are nested in 58 
countries/waves with certain characteristics (active religiosity based on national attendance rates 
and level of Catholic/Orthodox religiosity), multilevel analysis is the most suitable option. 
Secondly, as our hypotheses aim at investigating how individuals react differently to differences 
in country-level religiosity, multilevel analysis is very suited as it allows for testing cross-level 
interactions. We estimate different models with a different number of effects. These are effects 
of the variables at either the individual or at the national level, and we estimate the interactions 
between these variables. Each of the models also contains so-called random effects. These 
effects, noted as variances, are estimations of the variability of the mean level of  anti-religiosity 
in a country, and of the variability of the level of anti-religiosity at the individual level. Each 
model that shows lower levels of these two types of variability  explains anti-religiosity a bit 
better. Table 6 shows the results of our analysis. 
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[Insert Table 6 about here] 
First, we will explain what the different models of Table 6 mean. The first model 
basically shows us that anti-religiosity can be explained both at the individual level and at the 
context level. Roughly 10% of variance (0.052/(0.45+0.052)*100) can be explained by country-
level factors. The rest can, potentially, be explained by individual factors. As the first model does 
not include any variables, any inclusion of variables at either the individual level or the context 
level almost automatically results in lower levels of unexplained variance. This is indeed the case 
in model 2. Model 2 shows the significance of the independent variables, age, gender, education, 
socialism, and different measures of religiosity. The proportion of unexplained variance at the 
individual level has been reduced (from 0.45 to 0.41). The unexplained variance at the context 
level has been reduced considerably (from 0.052 to 0.017). As our hypotheses assume, the 
positive effect of socialism on anti-religiosity which we found in model 2 actually varies in 
strength between contexts. In other words, a necessary precondition is that in some contexts, 
socialists are apt to be more anti-religious than in other contexts. In model 3, we test and verify 
exactly that assumption. This model, which is identical to the previous one with respect to the 
number of effects of variables estimated, shows that the effect of socialism varies between 
contexts (0.008). Model 4 includes the interaction-effect for active religiosity and socialism, 
which we use to test our first hypothesis. This model does not appear to be a significant 
improvement of the third model. We will discuss below how this leads us to refute this 
hypothesis. The fifth model then also includes the interaction-effect for Catholic/Orthodox 
religiosity; this model does show to be a significant improvement of the third and fourth 
model
xiv
. In this model, we find two significant effects. Beside the positive and significant 
interaction term for Catholic/Orthodox religiosity in a country and socialism, we also find a 
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negative effect for the interaction between active religiosity in a country and socialism. This can 
be explained by the facts that there is a high correlation (.78***) between the two indicators for 
country-level religiosity and that the cross-level interactions of these variables with socialism 
cancel each other out. We will discuss what this means for our hypotheses below. 
Table 6 shows how socialism and anti-religiosity are generally positively correlated. 
Thus, it can be said that on average people with socialist political views are more inclined to hold 
negative views about religion, than people with other political views. The same can be said of 
males, who have higher levels of anti-religious attitudes than females (e.g. Bainbridge; Sherkat). 
That this effect for gender is even stronger than the socialism-effect, indicates that there is 
greater variety in anti-religious attitudes between socialists and non-socialists, than there is 
between males and females
xv
. Also we can see how people that live in countries with high levels 
of religiosity, regardless the type –  Protestant, Catholic/Orthodox and active religiosity – are less 
likely to have anti-religious attitudes. This is not surprising, since this variable is a mean score 
per country. Religious people will naturally have a more tolerant view of religion than non-
religious people. However, what interests us most is what the interaction effect of these types of 
religiosity and the effect of socialism is on the anti-religious attitudes. In other words, we want to 
know if the context influences the anti-religious attitude of socialists in a significant way, as our 
hypotheses suggest. 
Following hypothesis 1, we expected that the level of active religiosity of a country, as 
measured by the attendance rates, would influence the tendency of people with socialist ideals to 
have anti-religious attitudes positively. However, in countries with high levels of active 
religiosity, the effect of socialist ideals on anti-religiosity is not significant according to model 4 
and negative according to model 5. This is surprising, since we already saw that in general, 
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socialists tend to be anti-religious. Apparently, they are less so when they live in countries where 
they are surrounded by actively religious people. This contradicts the expectation as laid out in 
hypothesis 1, for which reason this hypothesis must be refuted. The outcomes in model 5 point to 
a possible continuation of the influence of socialism on Christian thought mentioned earlier and 
the different Christian-socialist movements that have proliferated in countries like England and 
the Netherlands. Figure 2 shows a visual representation of this effect (based on model 5 of Table 
6). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Our second hypothesis deals with the religious affiliation in a country. It expects that in 
countries with high levels of Catholic/Orthodox affiliation, people with socialist ideals will have 
higher levels of anti-religious sentiments. Figure 1 shows a visual representation of the results 
from Table 6 (model 5), concerning this hypothesis. 
[ Insert Figure 2 about here] 
This figure illustrates how socialism, Catholicism/Orthodoxy and anti-religiosity are related. 
Both in the Catholic/Orthodox countries and in the non-Catholic/Orthodox countries, people with 
higher levels of socialist ideals tend to have higher levels of anti-religious sentiments. However, 
it is interesting to see that this effect is stronger for the Catholic countries than for the non-
Catholic countries. As tables 3 and 4 show, the countries with higher levels of Catholic/Orthodox 
membership levels also tend to have a higher level of active religiosity. What, then, exactly is the 
trigger? In our analysis, both types of religiosity have been taken into account, in their 
interaction with socialism. Model 5 in Table 6 shows that for socialists, an environment of 
Catholic/Orthodox religiosity functions as a trigger, not because contexts with a large share of 
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Catholics/Orthodox happen to be contexts with a large share of actively religious people, but just 
because they live in countries with a larger share of people that are affiliated with the Catholic 
and/or Orthodox churches. This confirms the expectation as formulated in hypothesis 2. 
We will now conclude by discussing how these results are relevant for the current debate 
in the sociology of politics and religion. 
 
Conclusions 
The central question of this paper was whether it is pressure of religious activity or 
pressure based on religious identity that makes socialists resist religion. Our results point 
specifically to the countries marked by the collective identity of the Catholic and Orthodox 
religions, based on the level of affiliation and not on the level of involvement. This shows how, 
in the case of socialist anti-religiosity, religious and cultural identity is a stronger influence than 
religious and cultural practice (see also Berger “Rumor”; Noomen, Aupers and Houtman 6; 
Norris and Inglehart 17). What lies beyond the scope of our analysis is to assess the individual 
motivation of socialists to react to religious identity more strongly than to religious activity in the 
Catholic/Orthodox contexts. In the discussion on hypothesis 2, we mentioned a 
historical/political aspect of Catholic/Orthodox cultures, namely the way in which the Church 
and the state are entwined with each other, and a mono-cultural aspect, which involves the 
collective cultural values like solidarity and respect for authority, and creates a culture with a 
high level of homogeneity. Further research could explore which of the two aspects is more 
relevant for socialists and perhaps also, what individual characteristics those socialists have. Our 
inclination would be that a historical/political hypothesis that suggests that these churches have 
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been foundational to the power-distribution in the state and therefore trigger opposition, would 
resonate predominantly with the higher educated socialists. At the same time, we think that a 
cultural solidarity hypothesis that suggests that due to relative high levels of solidarity and 
homogeneity in Catholic/Orthodox contexts, socialists feel excluded as an out-group, both 
politically as religiously, would predominantly resonate with the lower educated working class 
(Houtman, Achterberg and Derks).  
What we could not endorse is the expected positive correlation between the anti-
religiosity of socialists and the context of active religiosity. There was no significant interaction-
effect in the fourth model and there was a significant negative correlation with the interaction-
effect in the fifth model. This implies that when there is an active religious community, this in 
itself does not lead socialists to oppose religiosity. This coincides with the finding of Ribberink, 
Achterberg and Houtman, who point to a stronger effect for the anti-religiosity of the lower 
educated, but only in contexts with low levels of active religiosity and vice versa (lower educated 
people have weaker anti-religious attitudes in contexts with high levels of active religiosity). 
This could possibly explain the negative relation between socialists’ anti-religious attitude and 
the level of active religiosity, as it suggests that there is some similarity in the perception of 
religion by lower educated people and socialists. This asks for more research, also because we 
need to expand our understanding of these processes and their interrelatedness.  
The mirroring of religious and political identities with opposed ideologies, which we 
have discussed and analysed, also underlines the importance of the debate on religious, post-
religious and secular identities. This debate, that has long transcended the private/public 
dichotomy over de place of religion in the modern societies, has taken centre stage in some 
recent European Union controversies, for example in the discussion on the possible admittance 
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of Turkey to the European Union (Casanova, see also Berlinerblau, Bruce “Post-Secularity”). 
We think our findings can help to specify exactly what (post-)religious cultural identities are and 
how they work, but also in what way religious identities have a different influence on these 
controversies than religious activity has.  
In what kind of religious cultures will a socialist become anti-religious and why? We 
have been stressing the central place of religious cultures in our analysis. Although our ‘religious 
pressure thesis’ could not be fully endorsed, we think our analysis opens up many more lines of 
inquiry that can follow its logic. Since we mainly looked at socialism as a mirror-image of 
Catholicism and Orthodoxy, one of those lines of inquiry is what kind of mirror-images can be 
found for the Protestant mono-cultures of Scandinavia, the mixed religious cultures of the 
Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom and what mirror-image the growth of Islam in 
Europe will result in. In order to further assess the empirical tenability of the religious pressure 
thesis, further research could also use this thesis in the exploration of the rise of anti-Islamism in 
countries like Norway, Switzerland and the Netherlands (and not in countries like Spain and 
Portugal) and the popularity of new atheism in the United Kingdom and the United States (see 
Cook, Cottrell and Webster). 
                                                          
i
 
‘
Since the real existence of man and nature has become evident in practice … the question about an alien being, 
about a being above nature and man—a question which implies the admission of the unreality of nature and of 
man—has become impossible in practice. Atheism, as the denial of this reality, has no longer any meaning, for 
atheism is a negation of God, and postulates the existence of man through this negation; but socialism … no longer 
stands in any need of such mediation … Socialism is man’s positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through 
the abolition of religion’. Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Vol. 3, 305–6 qtd. Geoghegan 
589. 
ii
 We follow Dalton in using  this distinction in types of religiosity. 
iii
 Martin argues that Protestant monopolies also exist, mainly in Scandinavia, but that there they feature 
individualistic values. This creates a different cultural dynamic in which there is no collective anti-religious reaction 
as can be seen in Catholic countries. Instead, there is a climate of religious indifference. 
iv
 We used the integrated dataset that has been made available through the Gesis.org-website. 
v
 see Maas and Hox, who state that for this kind of analysis a country-level sample size of at least 50 is preferred. 
This does not mean that some respondents are counted double, since these datasets do not consist of panel data. 
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vi
 Others would say that not Western Europe, but the United States is the odd one out (e.g. Bruce “Secularization”). 
For the sake of our argument this is not important and we follow Martin here in his view on Western Europe’s 
secularization. 
vii
 We excluded Northern Cyprus since it is part of Turkey 
viii
 We left out Greece 1999 because it has no results for 3 out of the 4 items concerning economical values, hence 
producing a lot of missings on that score. 
ix
 https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/ (accessed on 8
th
 of March 2013). 
x
 The modest score on the Cronbach’s alpha is partly due to the fact that only 3 items were measured. However 
increasing this measure with other indications of socialist values, as available in the EVS dataset, does not 
significantly increase the reliability, nor does it influence the outcomes of the multilevel tests that we did. In fact, it 
decreases the number of valid respondents, because several of the items that would be included contain a large 
number of missings, because they were not consistently asked in all countries and/or in every wave of the 
research. Therefore we have worked with this measure and the measure of voting behavior. 
xi
 Although there are many differences between the two church denominations, in literature they are seen as 
cultural counterparts, both creating collective national identities. This leads us to consider them as a single variable 
in this operationalization. 
xii
 We also checked for level of income. Including this variable did not significantly alter our findings. However it is a 
variable with a lot of missings (23%), therefore we did not include it in our model. We also did a model check with 
the different EVS-waves as dummy variables, which also did not influence our findings. For the sake of overview, 
we left these dummy variables out of the model presented. 
xiii
 The alternative that asked for people’s level of education was not consistently asked in all countries and in all 
three waves of the survey. 
xiv
 This fifth model is a better fit on a .900 probability scale. The explained variance of socialism (0.006) has a 
standard error of 0.0015, and thus measures a significant score. 
xv
 The effects in our model are not standardized, but a standardized model would give a similar output, with 
gender showing a 50% stronger effect than socialism. Since this is consistent with other findings and not directly 
relevant to our hypotheses, we have not elaborated on this difference further. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Factor and reliability analysis for the Economic values scale  
Item Factor Loading 
Preference for government ownership? 
Preference for competition as harmful? 
Preference for state responsible for providing? 
0.75 
0.73 
0.71 
Eigen value 1.59 
R
2
 0.53 
Cronbach’s α 0.56 
N 55,010 
Source: EVS 1990-2008. 
 
Table 2. Factor and reliability analysis for the Anti-Religiosity scale  
Item Factor Loading 
Convinced Atheist? 
Confidence in church low? 
0.75 
0.75 
Eigen value  1.50 
R
2 
 0.75 
Cronbach’s α 0.67 
N  64,280 
Source: EVS 1990-2008. 
 
Table 3. Percentage of actively religious people per country 
Country 1990 1999 2008 
Austria 0.45 0.43 0.28 
Belgium 0.35 0.28 0.18 
Cyprus 
  
0.56 
Denmark 0.11 0.12 0.10 
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Finland 0.11 
 
0.10 
France 0.17 0.12 0.12 
Germany 0.33 0.35 0.23 
Greece 
  
0.43 
Iceland 0.09 0.12 0.12 
Ireland 0.88 0.75 0.57 
Italy 0.51 0.53 0.48 
Luxembourg 
 
0.30 0.19 
Malta 0.90 0.87 0.84 
Netherlands 0.31 0.25 0.26 
Norway 0.13 
 
0.12 
Portugal 0.48 0.53 0.48 
Spain 0.41 0.36 0.26 
Sweden 0.10 0.09 0.08 
Switzerland 
  
0.20 
Great Britain 0.25 0.19 0.20 
Northern Ireland 0.69 0.60 0.54 
Source: EVS 1990-2008.  
 
Table 4. Catholic/Orthodox and Protestant Religiosity per country  
 Catholic/Orthodox  Protestant 
Country 1990 1999 2008  1990 1999 2008 
Austria 0.78 0.81 0.74  0.07 0.06 0.06 
Belgium 0.68 0.56 0.51  0.01 0.03 0.01 
Cyprus 
  
0.98    0.00 
Denmark 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.89 0.88 0.86 
Finland 0.01 
 
0.01  0.86  0.74 
France 0.58 0.54 0.45  0.01 0.02 0.01 
Germany 0.45 0.40 0.43  0.43 0.43 0.38 
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Greece 
  
0.95    0.00 
Iceland 0.01 0.00 0.02  0.94 0.91 0.88 
Ireland 0.93 0.89 0.84  0.02 0.02 0.04 
Italy 0.83 0.82 0.80  0.01 0.00 0.00 
Luxembourg 
 
0.66 0.63   0.03 0.03 
Malta 0.97 0.98 0.96  0.00 0.01 0.01 
Netherlands 0.29 0.22 0.27  0.17 0.18 0.22 
Norway 0.01 
 
0.03  0.88  0.73 
Portugal 0.77 0.86 0.83  0.00 0.00 0.01 
Spain 0.85 0.81 0.59  0.00 0.01 0.00 
Sweden 0.01 0.02 0.03  0.76 0.71 0.64 
Switzerland 
  
0.35    0.31 
Great Britain 0.10 0.14 0.11  0.46 0.63 0.39 
Northern Ireland 0.29 0.34 0.34  0.61 0.45 0.41 
Source: EVS 1990-2008. 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Variables used for Multilevel Analysis  
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Age respondent 68,638 15 108 46.25 17.655 
Gender 68,882 1 2 1.53 0.499 
Years of education 66,408 0 94 18.38 5.913 
Anti-Religiosity 68,625 -1.53 4.11 0.01 0.812 
Active Religiosity 68,918 0.08 0.90 0.34 0.205 
Socialism 47,803 -1.11 1.84 -0.01 0.674 
Catholic / Orthodox 
Religiosity 
68,918 0.00 0.98 0.51 0.332 
Protestant Religiosity 68,918 0.00 0.94 0.25 0.320 
Valid N (listwise) 46,141     
Source: EVS 1990-2008. 
 
Table 6. Explaining anti-religiosity (OLS multilevel analysis, Maximum Likelihood, N=(46,141) in 58 
country/waves.)  
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 1.94*** 2.82*** 2.81*** 2.81*** 2.81*** 
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(0.03) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Age  -- 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Gender Male -- 
0.19*** 
(0.01) 
0.19*** 
(0.01) 
0.19*** 
(0.01) 
0.19*** 
(0.01) 
Gender Female (ref) -- -- -- -- -- 
Years of education -- 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Catholic/Orthodox religiosity 
country 
-- 
-0.53** 
(0.17) 
-0.50** 
(0.16) 
-0.50** 
(0.16) 
-0.50** 
(0.16) 
Protestant  religiosity country -- 
-0.66*** 
(0.13) 
-0.64*** 
(0.13) 
-0.64*** 
(0.13) 
-0.65*** 
(0.13) 
Active religiosity country -- 
-0.65*** 
(0.14) 
-0.65*** 
(0.13) 
-0.66*** 
(0.13) 
-0.66*** 
(0.13) 
Socialism 
-- 
 
0.12*** 
(0.00) 
0.11*** 
(0.01) 
0.13*** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.02) 
Active religiosity country X 
socialism 
-- -- -- 
0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.27** 
(0.09) 
Catholic/Orthodox religiosity 
country X socialism 
-- -- -- -- 
0.17** 
(0.06) 
-2loglikelihood 94490.69 89895.66 89667.43 89669.97 89665.07 
Akaike's Information Criterion 
(AIC) 
94494.69 89899.66 89673.43 89675.97 89671.07 
N ( in 58 country/waves). 68,918 46,141 46,141 46,141 46,141 
Variance individual level 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 
Variance country level 0.052 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.015 
Variance socialism 
 
-- -- 0.008 0.008 0.006 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed test for significance). Source: EVS 1990-2008. 
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Figure 1. Effect of socialism on anti-religiosity in countries with low and high active religiosity score in 58 
country/waves 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Effect of socialism on anti-religiosity in countries with low and high Catholic/Orthodox religiosity score in 
58 country/waves 
 
 
